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LIFE IN ALL ITS FULLNESS: A
DISCUSSION OF CAPITALIZATION V.
DEDUCTION
INTRODUCTION *
Every year, billions of dollars ride on the issue of capitalizing
versus deducting repair expenses under Internal Revenue Code (the
"Code" or "IRC") section 162.' Capitalization/deduction issues are the
biggest issues on audit, making section . 162 the single Code section
generating the most dollar value controversy for business taxpayers.'
Indeed, classifying repair expenses is a major tax planning issue for
many American businesses. But to say that capitalization/deduction
issues are financially important is only the beginning of an interesting
inquiry.
More controversial is the evidence suggesting that the Internal
Revenue Service (the "Service" or the "IRS") is making unfair, incon-
sistent decisions that ignore well-established policy considerations and
cost businesses a considerable amount of mOney.' Based on such evi-
dence, this Note argues that the Service, Congress or both should
do something to improve the current method for deciding capitaliza-
* This Note's title derives from Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). judge Cardozo
wrote the following regarding the distinction between a currently deductible expense and an
expense that must be capitalized: "One struggles in vain for any verbal formula that will supply
a ready touchstone. The standard set up by the statute is not a rule of law; it is rather a way of
life. Life in all its fullness must supply the answer to the riddle." M.
'For example, in a recent article in the New York Times, a spokesperson from the Air
Transport Association stated that if the capitalization/deduction ruling in Technical Advice
Memorandum 96-18-004 (May 3, 1996) were applied nationally, it could cost the airline industry
more than one billion dollars between now and 2004. Matthew L. Wald, An I.R.S. Ruling Ruffles
Airline Industry Feathers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1996, at 5A. The spokesperson went on tb say that
the one billion dollars was a combination of interest charges that would become due for overdue
payments in past years and the higher cost of depreciating the expenditures over longer periods,
instead of being able to take a current, lump sum deduction. See id.
Issues regarding capitalization versus deduction under Code t 162 are referred to herein as
"capitalization/deduction" issues. Seel.R.C. § 162 (1994). In general, to make this Note accessible
to a broad audience, I have given terms of art simple definitions.
2 See Wald, supra note I; see also John Lee, Professor Says IRS Shouldn't Change Position on
Capitalizing Costs of Airplane Engine Overhauls, IRS TAx. CORRESPONDENCE, Oct. 18, 1996, avail-
able in WESTLAW, 96 TNT 204-11.
5 See infra notes 168-256 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Illinois Merchants Trust Co.,
Executor of the Estate of William R. Manierre, 4 A.T.A. 103, 103 (1926); see also Alan Gunn, The
Requirement That a Capital Expenditure Create or Enhance an Asset, 15 13.C. Brous. & Com. L. Rty.
443, 458 (1974).
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Lion/deduction issues. 4 The status quo is unacceptable and the time is
ripe for change. 5
This Note discusses this controversy using a recent Technical Ad-
vice Memorandum (the "TAM" or "96-18-004") as a point of refer-
ence.6 When the IRS asked for comments on 96-18-004, numerous
industrial leaders and congressional members replied, criticizing the
TAM's outcome and offering alternative analyses.' This suggests that
business taxpayers from numerous areas realized that the TAM was
further evidence of how the Service is raising revenues by making sus-
pect decisions. 8 The TAM's reasoning also illustrates numerous flaws
in the Service's current capitalization/deduction approach. 9 For these
reasons, the TAM is a useful reference point for discussion.m
Section I of this Note provides background on the sources of law
underlying capitalization/deduction issues and is divided into subsec-
tions on both statutory and case law." This Section also illustrates how
matching revenues with expenses incurred to earn those revenues
impacts capitalization/deduction decisions." Section II briefly exam-
ines the TAM in light of the background material in Section I." Section
4 See infra notes 168-256 and accompanying text.
5 See infra notes 168-256 and accompanying text.
See generally Tech. Adv. Mem. 96-18-004. The Service issues letter rulings called Technical
Advice Memoranda which advise taxpayers on the proper application of tax laws to a taxpayer's
return or refund. See Melissa D. Ingalls, lndopco, Inc. v. Commissioner: Determining the Taxable
Nature of a Target Corporation's Takeover Expenses, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 1165, 1166 n.12 (1994).
7 See David Field, IRS Rule Change Upsets Airlines, Repair Deduction a Safely "Penalty,' USA
Tonnv, Oct. 8, 1996, at 611; see also Stephan G. Doilinger, API Says Cost of Complying with Regs
Should Be Currently Deductible, IRS TAX CORRESPONDENCE, July 25, 1996, available in WESTLAW,
96 TNT 145-55 (American Petroleum Institute writing to IRS to say that costs of inspections
should have been currently deductible).
8 See supra note 7 and accompanying text. The numerous reactions to the TAM also support
the assertion that it is an important indicator, even though under I.R.C. § 6110, TAMs can only
be cited in limited circumstances as precedent. I.R.C. § 6110 (1994). Section 6110 reads in
pertinent part: "For the purposes of this section Mlle term 'written determination' means a
ruling, determination letter, or technical advice memorandum. . . . Unless the Secretary other-
wise establishes by regulations, a written determination may not be used or cited as precedent."
Id. In fact, the Secretary of the Treasury has limited the scope of § 6110(j) (3) by regulations. See
Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d) (3) (iii) (1997). The regulations state in pertinent part: "[O]nly the
following are authority for purposes of determining whether there is substantial authority for the
tax treatment of an item: . . . technical advice memoranda issued after October 31, 1976• "
Id. (applies to an accuracy-related penalty). Treasury Regulation § 1.6694-2 states that TAMs may
also be used to determine if a policy on a tax return satisfies the realistic possibility standard.
Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2 (1997); see also Costs Incurred for Inspection of Aircraft Must be Capitalized,
851 TAx'14 57, 57 (Meade Emory et al. eds., 1996) (hereinafter Costs].
9 See infra notes 168-256 and accompanying text.
I° See Costs, supra note 8 and accompanying text.
II See infra notes 16-133 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 134-67 and accompanying text.
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III, building on this examination, analyzes the Service's current posi-
don on capitalization/deduction issues and highlights major criticisms
of that position." This Section then discusses briefly the implications
of these arguments and possible future courses of action.' 5
I. BACKGROUND
A. Conceptual Background
This Section introduces some basic tax concepts. It includes work-
ing definitions of taxable income, capital expenditure and current
expense. In addition, this Section discusses the principle of matching
revenues with expenses, that principle's importance in classifying costs
and its importance in an accurate tax assessment. The advanced tech-
nicalities of these principles are beyond the scope of this Note. Here,
it is sufficient to say that matching revenues with the costs incurred to
earn those revenues is a material issue.' 6
L Taxable Income Definition
For the purposes of this Note, as the examples below are greatly
simplified, the concept of taxable income is straightforward.° Busi-
nesses are allowed to deduct the ordinary and necessary costs from
their total revenues to calculate their taxable income. 15 Thus, one may
think of taxable income as a figure determined by calculating how
much money a business has taken in during the year and subtracting
how much the business has paid out to earn that revenue (Revenues -
Costs Taxable Income).' 9
For example, assume Corporation earned $100 in revenue during
year one, but it paid $50 in costs to earn that revenue. This made its
taxable income $50 ($100 in revenue less $50 in costs). Corporation's
taxable income would then be multiplied by its applicable tax rate to
find its tax liability for year one. Thus, if we assume Corporation's
applicable tax rate was 10%, Corporation owed $5 at the end of year
one ($50 * 10% = $5). With this in mind, if Corporation's taxable
income was lower, its ultimate tax liability would have also decreased.
11 See infra notes 168-256 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 247-56 and accompanying text.
15 See lndopco, Inc. v, Commissioner, 503 U.S. 71,84 (1992).
17 This Note considers taxable income only in the context of businesses.
15 See I.R.C. § 162 (1994).
19 See id.
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2. Principle of Matching Income and Expenses
A discussion of the importance of matching a particular year's
revenues with the expenses incurred to earn those revenues is also
appropriate. Assume the same facts as above and also assume that
Corporation's income for year two was $125. Further assume that
Corporation made Improvements to a loader at the beginning of year
one. Those Improvements lasted for two years. In other words, the
Improvements helped Corporation earn income during year one and
during year two. Corporation paid for the Improvements in full at the
time it made them and the Improvement costs were $90. The $90
Improvement costs were the only costs Corporation incurred during
the two years the Improvements lasted. Also assume that the Improve-
ments were worth $50 at the end of year one and were totally worthless
at the end of year two.
In this simplified example, taxable income is revenue received less
the costs of earning that revenue." With this in mind, if Corporation
could deduct all $90 of its Improvement costs in year one, that would
distort Corporation's taxable income for both year one and year two. 21
After all, the Improvements helped Corporation earn revenues in year.
one and in year two. If Corporation could deduct all $90 of its Improve-
ment costs in year one, there would be no costs to account for the $125
in year two revenues. Thus, Corporation should have to divide the Im-
provement costs between years one and two in a manner that reflects
how much Corporation paid to use the Improvements during those
years. This division should match the Improvement costs for each year
with the revenues earned from expending those costs.22
One way to make such a division would be to treat the Improve-
ments' $40 decline in value during year one as the costs for earning
the $100 in year one revenues.23 Likewise, the Improvements' $50
2° See id.
21 Considering future benefits of an expenditure is important to the classification of expenses
because future benefits indicate that the expense incurred probably generates current income
as well as future income. Thus; where one objective of the Code is to match expenses with the
income they generate, expenses generating future benefits should be matched with future in-
come.
Of course, nearly all expenditures will have benefits beyond the year in which they are
incurred. This reality can make it hard to classify any expense as a current deduction, if the
expense creates benefits beyond the current taxable year. Some commentators have suggested
that, although highly unlikely, if the matching principle were carried to its extreme, no expense
would be deductible. See PAUL R. MCDANIEL ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, CASES AND
MATERIALS 427 (3d ed. 1994); see also infra notes 80-82.
22 See Indopco, 503 U.S. at 87.
23
 This method is taken from Code § 167. See I.R.C. § 167, Section 167 reads in pertinent
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decline in value during year two would be treated as the cost to earn
$125 during year two. In other words, the costs the Corporation "paid"
to earn its revenues were the decline in value of the Improvements.
Using this calculation, Corporation's taxable income for year one
would be $100 less the $40 decline in the Improvement's value, yield-
ing $60 in taxable income. In year two, Corporation had to "pay" the
remaining $50 of the Improvements' value to earn $125 in revenues.
This made Corporation's year two taxable income $75.
Note, these calculations attempt to "match" each year's Improve-
ment costs with Corporation's revenues from that year." Even though
Corporation actually paid for its Improvements in year one, the match-
ing principle distributes those costs over the years those Improvements
helped Corporation earn revenue. 25 Because the Improvement costs
helped Corporation during both years one and two, the Improvement.
costs must be distributed over both of those years. 26
3. Matching Principle as Used to Determine if Costs are Capital
Expenditures or Currently Deductible
A small extension of this example illustrates how the matching
concept relates to distinguishing current expenses from capital expen-
ditures. Assume that costs that can be matched to revenues from a
single year are current expenditures, while costs which can be matched
to revenues from multiple years are capital expenditures (the "one
year" rule of thumb)." Considering only this rule as a basis for analysis,
assume that Corporation spent $5 for Office Supplies that it exhausted
in year one. Therefore, the Office Supplies only helped Corporation
earn revenue during year one and should thus be matched with Cor-
poration's $100 year one revenues. Under the "one year" rule of
thumb, the Office Supply costs would be a current expense that could
properly be deducted from its $100 year one revenues. 28 If the Office
Supply costs were Corporation's only costs for year one, this would
make Corporation's year one taxable income $95 ($100 in revenues -
$5 in Office Supply costs = $95 in taxable income).
part: "There shall be allowed as a depreciation deduction a reasonable allowance for the exhaus-
tion, wear and tear (including a reasonable allowance for obsolescence)—(1) of property used
in the trade or business, or (2) of property held for the production of income." Id.
24 See Indopco, 503 U.S. at 87.
25 See id.
26 See id.
27 See United States v. Wherli, 400 E2d 686, 689 (10th Cir. 1968) (using a similar "one year"
rule of thumb). See generally I.R.C. §§ 162, 263; Treas. Reg. §§ 1.162-3, 1.162-4 (1997).
28 See Wherli, 400 F.2d at 689. See generally I.R.C. §§ 162, 263; Treas. Reg. §§ 1.162-8, 1.162-4.
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The Office Supply costs are different from the Improvement costs
discussed above because the Office Supplies only produced revenue in
year one, while the Improvements produced revenue in years one and
two. The Office Supply costs are currently deductible expenses, but the
Improvement costs must be capitalized over two years (deducted in
installments over years one and two). Thus, under the "one year" rule
of thumb described above, the Improvement costs for years one and
two would be considered capital expenditures and the Improvements
would be capital assets. 29
B. Statutory Provisions
Numerous Code provisions dictate how expenses affect taxable
income. 3° Code sections 162 and 263 provide for an accurate calcula-
tion of taxable income by matching income with the costs incurred to
produce that income.." Section 162, with its attendant regulations,
generally provides that businesses can deduct from taxable income the
costs of producing that income. 32 Section 263, with its own host of
regulations, supplements section 162 by indicating that expenses for
29 See Wherli, 400 F.2d at 689. See generally I.R.C. §§ 162, 263; Treas. Reg. §§ 1.162-3, 1.162-4.
39 See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 162, 167, 263. A lengthy discussion on the nuances of these various
sections is beyond the scope of this Note. The sections quoted below are those which are most
applicable to the subject matter considered herein.
31 See I.R.C. §§ 162, 263. Section 162 states in pertinent part: "There shall be allowed as a
deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the year in carrying
on any trade or business ...." I.R.C. § 162. The "necessary" element of this language is very easy
to fulfill, as it has been defined as anything which is "appropriate and helpful" for a business.
See, e.g., Indopco, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 71, 85 (1992); Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S.
687, 689 (1966). The great ambiguity of the "ordinary" element is not readily apparent; this single
word of § 162 is largely responsible for the litigation fried under this section. See Indopco, 503
U.S. at 85-86.
Section 263 states in pertinent part: "(a) General Rule.—No deduction shall be allowed
for—(1) Any amount paid out for new buildings or for permanent improvements or betterments
made to increase the value of any property or estate.. .. (2) Any amount expended in restoring
property or in making good the exhaustion thereof for which an allowance is or has been made."
I.R.C. § 263. Of course, if taxpayers had to capitalize all expenses that added value to their assets,
then nothing would be currently deductible—sonic courts have been cognizant of this and do
not read the language of § 263 so literally. See, e.g., Encyclopedia Etritannica v. Commissioner, 685
F.2d 212, 217 (7th Cir. 1982). On the other hand, as discussed below, the current trend in the
Service's reasoning appears to go in just the opposite direction. See infra notes 197-218 and
accompanying text.
52 See I.R.C. § 162. The attendant regulations state the following:
Repairs—The cost of incidental repairs which neither materially add to the value
of the property nor appreciably prolong its life, but keep it in an ordinarily efficient
operating condition, may be deducted as an expense .... Repairs in the nature of
replacements to the extent that they arrest deterioration and appreciably prolong
the life of the property, shall either be capitalized and depreciated in accordance
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permanent improvements that increase the value of property must be
capitalized."
IRC section 161 gives guidance on how to read sections 162 and
263 in conjunction." In general terms, section 161 states that where
section 263 dictates that an expense must be capitalized, such a char-
acterization controls over a determination made under section 162. 35
In other words, section 161 says that where sections 162 and 263 give
conflicting results, section 263 will contro1. 36
When an expense is paid to acquire a capital asset, section 167
tells a taxpayer the length of that asset's "life" for the purposes of Code
sections 162 and 263. 37 The asset's "life" is then used to determine how
quickly the taxpayer can recover the cost of the asset via deductions
from taxable income. 38 Just as with sections 162 and 263, the policy
behind this section is one of matching expenses with the income they
generate." A capital asset will be consumed as it produces income over
a period of years, thus the cost of a capital asset should be recovered
incrementally over the years it produces income. 4°
with section 167 or charged against the depreciation reserve if such an account is
kept.
Treas, Reg. § 1.162-4 (1997). As is obvious from the broad language of the statute, any exact
definition of repair is not to be found therein. See Indopco, 503 U.S. at 86; Welch v. Helvcring,
290 U.S. 111, 114, 116 (1933).
" See I.R.C. § 263; see also Trcas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-I (b). The regulations state:
In general, the amounts referred to in paragraph (a) of this section include
amounts paid or incurred (1) to add to the value, or substantially prolong the useful
life, of property owned by the taxpayer, such as plant or equipment, or (2) to adapt
property to a new or different use. Amounts paid or incurred for incidental repairs
and maintenance of property arc not capital expenditures within the meaning of
subparagraphs (1) and (2) of this paragraph.
Treas. Reg. § 1.263 (a)-1 (b); see I.R.C. § 162; Treas. Reg. § 1.162-4.
I.R.C. § 161. The Code states in pertinent part: "In computing taxable income under
section 63, there shall be allowed as deductions the items specified in this part, subject to the
exceptions provided in part IX (section 261 and following, relating to items not deductible)." Id.
" See id.; Tech. Adv. Mein. 96-38-001 (Sept, 20, 1996).
" See Tech. Adu Mem. 96-38-001.
" See I.R.C. § 167.
"See id. For example, the pertinent sections for calculating the useful life of the engines in
the TAM are Treasury Regulations §§ 1 .167(a)-12(d) (3) (ii), which state in pertinent part: "For
the purpose of sections 162 and 263 and the regulations thereunder, whether an expenditure
prolongs the life of an asset shall be determined by reference to the expected period of use of
the asset in the taxpayer's business without regard to paragraph (a) (5) (ii) of this section." Trcas.
Reg. §§ 1.167(a)-12(d)(3)(ii). In the case of the aircraft engines in the TAM, their "expected
period of use" was more than 22 years. See TAM 96-18-004; Burgess j.W. Raby & William L. Raby,
Capitalizing the Costs of Aircraft Engine Overhauls, SPECIAL REroirrs, May 23, 1996, available in
WESTLAW, 96 TNT 102-67.
" See Indopco, Inc. v, Commissioner, 503 U.S. 71, 84 (1992).
40 See id.
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C. Financial Analysis Discussion
Another aspect of the capitalization/deduction area is the finan-
cial difference between deducting and capitalizing a given cost. The
basic difference between the two is a function of the "time value of
money."'" Due to the time value of money, a current deduction is worth
more than capitalizing deductions incrementally and reducing future
tax liabilities.°
D. Capitalization/Deduction Issues in Repairs Cases
Cases in the capitalization/deduction area are difficult to harmo-
nize.° Two factors contribute to this difficulty. First, decisions in the
capitalization/deduction area are highly fact specific, making distinc-
tions between current expenses and capital expenditures "those of
degree and not of kind."44 Second, cases in this area are usually little
more than a description of the expenditure in question and a conclu-
sion that it is, or is not, a capital expenditure. 45
 Where the decision-
maker does provide some substantive analysis, it sometimes directly
conflicts with reasoning used in other decisions. 46
This section is broken into three parts. To provide some context,
the first part is a discussion of Indopco, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal
41
 The time value of money can be defined in simple terms as the difference between the
value of readily available funds and the right to receive funds at sometime in the future. See
Ingalls, supra note 6, at 1170 n.32.
For example: If the taxpayer keeps $1,000 now and puts it in the bank at 7% interest,
at the end of one year the $1,000 is worth $1,070. Therefore, $1,000 at the end of
one year is not worth the same as $1,000 today; it is $70 less than what it could be.
Of course this disparity grows over time. It should become clear that it is more
advantageous to immediately deduct money from current taxable income than it is




43 See Gunn, supra note 3, at 443. Although Professor Gunn's assertion is a bit dated, the
cases it refers to are still good law, so it remains true today. See id.
While the results of these cases are conflicting, they do typically share some procedural
attributes. Parties usually stipulate to the pertinent facts, except the determination as to whether
a given expense was a capital expenditure or a deductible repair. See, e.g., Plainfield Union Water
Co. v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 353, 344 (1962); In re Illinois Merchants Trust Co., 4 B.T.A. 103,
103 (1926). In addition, in every case, the burden is on the taxpayer to prove that a deduction
should be allowed. See Indopco, 503 U.S. at 84.
44 Indopco, 503 U.S. at 86 (quoting Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 114 (1933)). In Stoelizing
u Commissioner, the Third Circuit made a similar observation. See 266 E2d 374, 376 (3d Cir. 1959)
("The line of demarcation between deductible repairs and additions to capital is, of course,
obscure.").
45 See Gunn, supra note 3, at 458.
46 Compare Plainfield Union, 39 T.C. at 338 (using taxpayer's original expectations to measure
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Revenue. 47 The second part deals with the current alternatives for meas-
uring how much a given expense increases the value or prolongs the
life of property." The third part briefly discusses two doctrines that can
_transform otherwise deductible expenses into capital expenditures: (1)
the rehabilitation doctrine" and (2) the government regulation doc-
trine.5°
1. Indopco v. Commissioner
Indopco's after effects were quite dramatic.`'' One commentator
found that after the decision came down, "IRS field agents were run-
ning wild, using the ruling to deny all manner of deductions."52 What
stirred all this activity? An extension of the example discussed above
will illustrate the answer.
In the example above, the rule for classifying expenditures dic-
tated that a capital expenditure was any expense that helped Corpora-
tion earn revenues during more than one year. This rule was tied to
the principle that revenues from a given year should match the ex-
penses incurred to generate those revenues. For the sake of simplicity,
the example also stated that Corporation exhausted its Office Supplies
during one year and that the Office Supplies only helped Corporation
earn revenues in that year. Thus, Corporation could match the Office
Supply costs to the revenues from that year and deduct those costs
currently.
In fact, this is only one interpretation of the Corporation's expen-
diture for the OffiCe Supplies. The Office Supplies helped Corporation
earn revenues during one year. On a more basic level, however, they
allowed the Corporation to stay in business during that year. In turn,
Corporation could earn revenues in future years. Thus, one could say
that because the Office Supplies kept Corporation in business, the
increase in value), and Illinois, 4 B.T.A. at 107 (using taxpayer's original expectations to measure
increase in value), with Rev. Rut. 88-57, 1988-2 C.B. 36, 37 (comparing asset value just before
repair with asset value just after repair to measure increase in value).
47 See infra notes 51-69 and accompanying text.
45 See infra notes 70-89 and accompanying text.
49 See infra notes 90-119 and accompanying text.
5° See infra notes 120-33 and accompanying text.
51 See John W. Lee, Doping Out the Capitalization Rules After INDOPCO, SPECIAL REPORTS,
Nov. 9, 1992, available in WESTLAW, 92 TNT 225-86.
52 This is true simply because the cases dealing with repairs have always looked to the future
benefit of the repair as an indicator of whether an expense should be capitalized. Seejohn Paul
LeBlanc, The Supreme Court Attempts to "Iron Our the Wrinkles in National Starch, 54 LA. L. REV,
437, 459 (1993); Sarah R. Lyke, Indopco, Inc. v. Commissioner: National Starch Decision Adds
Wrinkles to Capital Expenditure Issue, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 1239, 1267-68 (1994).
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Office Supplies also allowed Corporation to earn future revenues dur-
ing subsequent years. Using the "one year" rule of thumb for classifying
expenses, the.Office Supply expenses would be capital expenditures,
as they helped Corporation earn revenues from multiple years.
At first glance this result seems incorrect. After all, Corporation
exhausted its Office Supplies during one year. In the following years,
Corporation probably bought more office supplies to replace those
that it had exhausted. It does not seem correct to attribute the reve-
nues from subsequent years to the Office Supplies that Corporation
exhausted long before. If the Service could classify the Office Supply
costs as capital expenditures using this reasoning, then any expense
could conceivably be deemed a capital expenditure. As a result, tax-
payers would lose considerable money because they would have to
capitalize all of their costs.
The Indopco Court's opinion suggested that expenses generating
any future benefits should be capitalized, and the fear of this possible
treatment for expenditures scared many taxpayers. In fact, Indopco's
emphasis on future benefits did not fundamentally change the analysis
in repairs capitalization/deduction cases, but Indopco did highlight
future benefits as a main factor for deciding capitalization/deduction
cases. 55 As the extensive commentary on Indopco suggests, this was
enough to make taxpayers look very closely at the Court's opinion.
In 1992, in Indopco, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the
Supreme Court held that professional services expenses incurred as
part of a corporate merger should be capitalized . 54 In support of this
holding, the Supreme Court emphasized three aspects of its pertinent
precedents: 1) expenses need not create or enhance a separate capital
asset in order to be capital expenditures; 2) deductions from income
for expenses are exceptions to the norm of capitalization; 3) where the
benefits from an expenditure extend into future years, such an expen-
diture is more likely to be matched appropriately to future income via
capitalization or amortization. 55
In Indopco, the taxpayer was a corporation that had paid acquisi-
tion-related expenses, including legal expenses, in connection with a
merger.56
 The taxpayer asserted that these expenses were deductible
against current income pursuant to section 162 of the Code and filed
a return consistent with that position in 1978.57 The IRS then audited
53 See LeBlanc, supra note 52, at 459; Lyke, supra note 52, at 1267-68.
54 Indopco, 503 U.S. at 90.
55 See id. at 84, 87.
55
 See id. at 82.
57 See id,
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the taxpayer and disallowed the deductions." Both the Tax Court and
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the
Service's findings. 59
The Indopco Court began its analysis by reviewing Code sections
162 and 263 and pointing out that the policy objective behind these
sections is to match the expenses and revenues of a taxable period, to
yield an accurate calculation of net income." In commenting on the
typical operation of these sections, the Court pointed out that deduc-
tions under section 162 are exceptions to the norm of capitalization
for two primary reasons." First, pertinent Supreme Court precedent
puts the burden on the taxpayer to show the right to a claimed deduc-
tion." Second, while capital expenditures are not specifically enumer-
ated in the Code, current deductions are so enumerated, subjecting
deductions to disallowance in favor of capitalization. 65 Notwithstanding
these reasons, the Court also stated that making distinctions between
current expenses and capital expenditures is a matter of degree; each
case turns on special factual distinctions, making these cases appear
difficult to harmonize." Next, the Court stated that where an expense
results in benefits continuing beyond the year in which the expendi-
ture is incurred, that fact is "undeniably important" in determining
whether immediate deduction or capitalization is appropriate."
The Court then applied this reasoning to the facts of the case."
The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals's finding that the taxpayer
would realize benefits from the merger well beyond the taxable year
when it paid the professional fees." In addition, the Court looked to
precedent for the "well-established rule" that expenses incurred in
mergers are not deductible under section 162." With these principles
as a basis, the Court held that the professional fees were capital ex-
penses."
58 See id.
59 See Indopco, 503 U.S. at 82.




" See Indopco, 503 U.S. at 86.
68 See id.; see also Malin:vim., supra note 21 and accompanying text.
66 See Indopro, 503 U.S. at 88-90.
67 See id. at 88.
68 See id. at 89.
69 See id. at 90. Once its reasoning was applied to the facts of Indopro, the Court relied almost
exclusively on the future benefit doctrine to find that the expenses should be capitalized. See id.
at 88-90.
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2. Two Alternatives for Measuring Increase in Value and Prolonged
Life
Currently, in deciding capitalization/deduction issues, the Service
has two choices for measuring the amount a given expense increases
the value or prolongs the life of any property involved. Under both
methods, where an expense results in an increase in value or substan-
tially prolongs the useful life of property, such an expense will be
considered a capital expenditure. These choices are straightforward in
their application, but often lead to conflicting results.
The first option is the "original expectations" valuation. 70 This
analysis measures how much incurring a cost increases an asset's value
or prolongs its life as follows: (1) it determines the value and lifespan
the taxpayer expected the asset to have at the time the cost was in-
curred, (2) it determines the value of the asset and its expected
lifespan after the cost was incurred, and (3) it compares these two
valuations!' If the asset has increased in value or gained years on its
expected life based on that comparison, the original expectations
analysis would classify the cost as a capital expenditure. 72 Thus, if a cost
allows a taxpayer to repair some heavy equipment, and as a result the
equipment will last one year longer than expected, such a cost would
be considered a capital expenditure." On the other hand, if the heavy
79 See generally Schroeder v. Commissioner, 72 T.C.M. (CCH) 185 (1996) (distinguishing
capital expenses from current expenditures using original expectations analysis); Frank v. Com-
missioner, 71 T.C.M. (CCH) 2748 (1996) (distinguishing installation of new capital from currently
deductible painting expenses); Tech. Adv. Mem. 96-45-002 (Nov. 8, 1996) (finding training costs
to be current expenditures).
71 See Plainfield Union Water Co. v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 333, 338 (1962). Accord Jacks v.
Commissioner, 55 T.C.M. (CCH) 960 (1988). See generally LaSalle Trucking Co. v. Commissioner,
22 T.C.M. (CCH) 1375 (1963).
Jacks illustrates what courts sometimes perceive as the difference between a capital expendi-
ture and a currently deductible repair. See generally 55 T.C.M. (CCH) at 960. In Jacks, the taxpayer
replaced two major components on its loader. See id. at 969. First, the taxpayer replaced the
loader's transmission with a used transmission. See id. Second, the taxpayer overhauled the
loader's engine. See id. The court then applied the "original expectations" analysis to both repairs.
See id. at 969-70. The court found that the used transmission simply allowed the loader to live
out its originally expected life; thus, the taxpayer could deduct the transmission replacement cost
currently. See id, On the other hand, the court found that rebuilding the engine allowed the
loader to outlive its originally expected life span. See id. With this, the court held that the costs
for rebuilding the engine had to be capitalized. See id.
For another similar case, consider LaSalle Trucking Co. u. Commissioner, 22 T.C.M. (CCH)
1375 (1963). In LaSalle, the taxpayer would rotate worn truck engines with overhauled engines
to minimize downtime on trucks needing repair. See id. at 1380-81. The costs of repairs in LaSalle
were almost half the cost of a new truck. See id. The court found that the engine repair
expenditures should be capitalized. See id. at 1383.
72 See LaSalle, 22 T.C.M. at 1383.
73
 See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
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equipment will only live out its expected operational life, even with the
repair costs, then there has been no increase in value under the
original expectations analysis. 74
The following discussion details how this analysis typically oper-
ates. In 1962, in Plainfield-Union Water Co. v. Commissioner, the Tax
Court of the United States decided that the taxpayer in question, a
public utility, did not have to capitalize the costs of repairing its pipe-
lines." The court pointed out that the proper measure of increased
value is not yielded by comparing the asset's value at the time just
before the repair to the asset's value just after the repair." Under such
an analysis, the court reasoned, any proper repair would increase
value." The proper comparison, the court stated, was between the
asset's value at the time of the repair and the asset's value before the
condition necessitating the expenditure (the "original expectation"). 78
Using this test, the court made four critical findings regarding the pipe
repairs: 1) they restored the pipes to their original carrying capacity,
2) they were not part of an overall plan of rehabilitation, 3) they did
not increase the useful life, value or strength of the pipes, and 4) they
did not , adopt the pipes to a new or different use."
The original expectations analysis works from the premise that, if
taken literally, the language in sections 162 and 263 would unduly
prohibit the deduction of certain expenditures.8° More specifically, the
analysis takes into account the fact that where taxpayers incur repair
costs, those costs will increase the value of property over what the
property's value would have been without the repair. 8 ' If taxpayers were
forced to compare the value of their property immediately before and
after any repairs to measure increase in value, a literal reading of
sections 162 and 263 would treat nearly all repair costs as capital
expenditures. 82
There is another valuation method that takes this rather harsh
approach, and in so doing, sometimes conflicts with the original ex-
pectations analysis." Under this alternative method, as expressed in
Revenue Ruling 88-57 (the "Rev. Rul." or "88-57"), the increase in
14 See id.
75 39 T.C. at 338.
76 See id.
77 See id. This clearly echoes the reasoning put forth in In re Illinois Merchants Trust. See 4
B.T.A. 103, 107 (1926).
" See Plainfield Union, 39 T.C. at 338.
76 See id. at 337.
BB See Illinois, 4 B.T.A. at 107.
III See id.
B2 See id.; see also Plainfield Union, 39 T.C. at 338.
63 See Rev. Rul. 88-57, 1988-2 C.B. 36, 37,
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value resulting from any repair expense should be measured as follows:
the Service will compare the value of the property just before the repair
with the value of the property just after the repair." Under the 88-57
reasoning, if a taxpayer performs a repair properly, then such a repair
almost inevitably will result in an increase in value. 85 In turn, since any
increase in value can trigger capitalization treatment under section
263, most repair expenses thus, will be considered capital expendi-
tures."
Note the clear possibility for conflicting results between the origi-
nal expectations and 88-5 7 methods. The original expectations
method classifies costs as capital expenditures only where they prolong
the life of property beyond what the taxpayer expected at the time of
purchase." In contrast, the 88-57 method treats nearly all repair costs
as capital expenditures." Thus, the 88-57 method could classify costs
as capital expenditures while the original expectations method would
treat the same costs as currently deductible."
3. Doctrines Which Can Change How an Expense Is Classified
a. Doctrine of Rehabilitation
Repair costs that would normally be considered deductible can be
classified as capital expenditures under the doctrine of rehabilitation."
This doctrine relates to both the matching principle and the options
for measuring increase in value and prolonged life." After a taxpayer
rehabilitates an asset, the costs for that work will help the taxpayer earn
"Id. Reu Rul. 88-57 states that the original expectations method should only be used where
a sudden and unexpected event forces a taxpayer to repair property. See id. This synthesis of the
case law ignores the holding in Plainfield Union, as the taxpayer there could use the original
expectations analysis despite the fact that there was no sudden and unanticipated damage to the
repaired asset. See generally Plainfield Union, 39 T.C. at 338. Thus, this Note rejects Rev. Rul.
88-57s synthesis of the case law and assumes that either test is applicable to a range of situations.
85 See Rev. Rul. 88-57, 1988-2 C.B. at 37; see also Illinois, 4 B.T.A. at 107.
85 See Illinois, 4 B.T.A. at 107; Rev. Rut. 88-57, 1988-2 CB. at 37; see also I.R.C. § 263 (1994).
87
 See supra notes 71-73.
88 See supra notes 80-82.
85 See supra notes 70-88.
95 See United States v. Wherli, 400 F.2d 686,698 (10th Cir. 1968). See generally Hotel Kingkade
v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 310 (10th Cir. 1950); 88-57, 1988-2 C.B. at 36. Further decisions
regarding the doctrine of rehabilitation arc available. See, e.g., Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. United
States, 449 F.2d 816,821-22 (10th Cir. 1971) (finding that partly because project was "well defined
in scope," a plan of rehabilitation was present); Bank of Houston v. Commissioner, 19 T.C.M.
(CCH) 589,592 (1960) (illustrating that the component parts of a rehabilitation project, which
would normally be repairs if done alone, must be capitalized when part of larger plan of
rehabilitation; explicitly rejecting approach of considering repairs individually).
91 See supra notes 20-26,70-88.
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income in multiple years, as the improvements will typically last for
more than a single year.92 In addition, the asset is worth more than
what the taxpayer expected the asset to be worth at that point in its
operational life," Likewise, the asset will have a longer operational life
as a result of the rehabilitation." Therefore, where a taxpayer rehabili-
tates property, the costs for that rehabilitation should be capital expen-
ditures under either the matching principle or the valuation options
described above. 95
The intricacies of this doctrine are not as simple. A number of
small expenses usually make up the costs for a given plan of rehabili-
tation, and some of those expenses would conceivably be treated as
current expenses if incurred independently." Because the rehabilita-
tion costs help the taxpayer to earn revenues in multiple years, how-
ever, all of those costs should be treated as capital expenditures.97
Therefore, where individual expenses are part of a larger plan of
rehabilitation, the Service will group those expenses together and treat
them all as capital costs." This is true even though some of those
expenses would be currently deductible if incurred on their own."
The key question thus becomes: when will this doctrine impact
how a given expense should be classified? Whether a plan of rehabili-
tation exists, and whether a particular item is part of it, are usually
questions of fact to be determined by the fact finder based on the
totality of circumstances.'" The factors in such a determination might
include the purpose, nature and extent of the work done, as well as
any resulting increase in value.'° 1 Examining the purpose might in-
clude discerning whether the work was done for an incoming tenant
or to adapt the property to a new or different use.'"
To illustrate some of these concepts, consider Revenue Ruling
88-57. 1" In 88-57, the IRS published its determination that where a
railroad rehabilitates its freight-train cars as part of a cyclical rehabili-
92 See, e.g., 88-57, 1988-2 C.B. at 37.
98 See id. at 36-37.
94 See id. at 37.
99 See id. at 36-37.
96 See id.
97 See 88-57, 1988-2 C.B. at 36-37.
98 See id.
99 See id.
199 See United States v. Wherli, 400 F.2d 686, 690 (10th Cir. 1968).
161 See id.
L92 See id.
"1988-2 C.13. at 37. For a similar case, see generally, Wolfsen Land & Cattle Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 72 T.C. 1 (1979).
268	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 39:253
tation plan, and the value of the cars materially increases as a result,
such rehabilitations are capital expenditures."' In the Rev. Rut, the
taxpayer in question was a railroad. 106 The railroad established a pro-
gram for rehabilitating its freight-train cars, which included the follow-
ing: complete disassembly, inspection and reconditioning and/or re-
placement of components of the suspension and draft systems, trailer
hitches and other special equipment."6 Rehabilitation would usually
occur after eight to ten years of use, at a time when the car typically
had a value of $8000; after a rehabilitation the car would be worth
approximately $30,000 and would have a further service life of twelve
to fourteen years.' 47 If the railroad did not rehabilitate the cars, they
would have a service life of twelve to fourteen years from the date of
their first use. With regular rehabilitations, however, the cars could last
in excess of thirty years. 108 The railroad depreciated the cars' costs over
a seven-year period. "6
The Rev. Rut discussed the state of the applicable law and stated
that three tests could be used to determine whether an expense should
be capitalized or deducted currently.'" According to the Service, a
taxpayer should examine all three tests before determining that an
expense is deductible, and if any of the three tests are met, an expense
should be capitalized." The first two tests were straightforward: an
expense should be capitalized where it appreciably prolongs the useful
life of the property or where the expenditure materially adds to the
value of the property.'" The third test stated that where an expenditure
is made for an item as part of a general plan of rehabilitation, improve-
ment or modernization, the expense must be capitalized, even though
standing alone, portions of the expense may have been classified as
currently deductible repairs."'
The Service determined that the railroad's expenses met the first
test, as the rehabilitation program increased the cars' lives from twelve
or fourteen years to thirty years, an appreciable increase."4 Next, the
Service determined that the rehabilitation expenses added materially
IM See 88-57, 1988-2 C.B. at 36.
1 °5 See id.
1 °8 See id.
197 See id.
198 See id.
1 °9 See 88-57, 1988-2 C.B. at 36.
11 ° See id. at 37.
" 1 See id.
"I See id.
US See id.
114 S& 88-57, 1988-2 C.B. at 36, 37. The Service stated Treasury Regulation sections
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to the value of the property. 15 According to the Service, this increase
was properly measured as follows: since sudden and unanticipated
damage did not occur, the appropriate comparison of value was the
value of the cars immediately prior to the rehabilitation with the value
of the cars immediately after the rehabilitation." 6 Before rehabilita-
don, the cars were typically worth $8000, but after rehabilitation, their
value jumped to approximately $30,000, making the $22,000 change
in value material." 7 Third, the Service determined that the car reha-
bilitations were made pursuant to a plan of rehabilitation, modern-
ization and improvement, making the rehabilitation costs capital ex-
penditures. 18 Thus, under all three tests, the service found that the
expenses at issue in the Rev. Rul. were capital expenses." 9
b. Government Regulation Doctrine
In most cases where a repair is made solely because of government
regulations, courts will find that such a repair increases the value of
the capital asset involved.' 2° In this way, just as with the rehabilitation
doctrine above, the government regulations doctrine can change how
an expense will be classified.' 2 ' An expense that would otherwise have
been considered currently deductible might be considered a capital
expenditure, simply because it brings a piece of property into compli-
ance with government regulations.' 22 In fact, courts often concede that
any material increase in value can be attributed exclusively to bringing
1.167(a)-11(g)(1)(ii)(b) and section 1.167(a)-12(d) (3) (ii). See id. The Service stated that
whether a rehabilitation prolonged the life of an asset was to be determined using the anticipated
life from the time the asset was first placed in service, where the taxpayer was a corporation using
the asset depreciation range or class life system. See id.
115 See id.
" 6 See id.
117 See id. at 36-37. But seeAmerican Milberg Corp. v. Commissioner, 10 T.C. 361, 378 - (1948)
(holding that although company's expenditures to remedy structural problems were significant,
they did not materially increase the value of the property from the time it was first built and
therefore were currently deductible).
See 88-57, 1988-2 C.B. at 36, 37.
119 See id. at 37.
3 " See Swig Inv. Co. v. United States, No. 95-5051, 1996 WL 580320, at *4 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 10,
1996); Teitelbaum v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 541, 544 (7th Cir. 1961); Cerda v. United States,
No. 82 C 3852, 1984 WI., 2803, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 30, 1984); Blue Creek Coal v. Commissioner,
48 T.C.M. (CCH) 1504, 1508 (1984); Hotel Sulgrave, Inc. v. Commissioner, 21 T.C. 619, 622
(1954).
121 See Swig, 1996 WL 580320, at *4; Teitelbaum, 294 F.2d at 544; Cerda, 1984 WL 2803, at *5;
Blue Creek Coal, 48 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1508; Hotel Sulgrave, 21 T.C. at 622.
122 See Swig, 1996 WI., 580320, at *4; Teitelbaum, 294 F.2d at 544; Cerda, 1984 WI, 2803, at *5;
Blue Creek Coal 48 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1508; Hotel Sulgrave, 21 T.C. at 622.
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a piece of property in line with government regulations. 123 In other
words, an asset which meets government regulations is deemed to be
worth materially more than an asset which does not, thereby making
the costs incurred for the work performed on the former asset capital
expenditures.' 24
For example, consider Teitelbaum v. Commissioner.' 25 In 1961, in
Teitelbaum, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
held that the taxpayer in question had to capitalize the costs of rewiring
his building. 126 The taxpayer rewired his building from DC to AC power
to comply with the local building code.'" The court stated that merely .
because the rewiring was done involuntarily, pursuant to a city ordi-
nance, did not mean the expense was currently deductible. 128 The
court reasoned that even though the electrical work may not have im-
proved the property by increasing its attractive appearance or effi-
ciency, or prolonging its life, such modifications did render the prop-
erty more valuable for the taxpayer's use by bringing it into compliance
with the applicable regulation.'" With this reasoning, the court con-
cluded that the rewiring expenses were not currently deductible.'"
The Teitelbaum dissent would have held the rewiring expenses
currently deductible."' In evaluating the expenses, the dissent used
language that closely mirrored the applicable sections of the Code.'"
Judge Major stated that the expenses did not increase the value, pro-
long the life or change the use of the property, thereby concluding
that the expenses should have been currently deductible.'"
123 See Swig, 1996 WL 580520, at *4; Teitelbaum, 294 F.2d at 544; Cerda, 1984 WL 2803, at *5;
Blue Creek Coal, 48 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1508; Hotel Sulgrave, 21 T.C. at 622.
124 See Cerda, 1984 WL 2803, at *4-5 (mentioning only meeting Chicago's building code as
increase in value); Hotel Sulgrave, 21 T.C. at 620-21.
294 F.2d at 544.
126 See id.
' 27 See id.
128 See id.
1 " See id.
13° See Teitelbaum, 294 F.2d at 544,547.
131 See id. at 548 (Major, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
"See id. (Major, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
133 See id. at 548-49 (Major, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In fact, the dissent
implied that even if a buyer would pay more for a building with proper wiring, such a fact would
not dictate that the wiring expenses should be capitalized. See id (Major, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). The dissent's reasoning is analogous to the "original expectations"
analysis discussed above. See generally supra notes 70-82 and accompanying text.
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II. TAM 96-18-004
In 1996, the IRS issued TAM 96-18-004, which stated that expen-
ditures for major inspections performed on aircraft engines, as re-
quired by the FAA, must be capitalized under section 263 of the
Code. 134 The issue at the heart of the TAM was the treatment of certain
repair expenses of an unnamed airline (the "Airline").' 35 The IRS
decided that the Airline had to capitalize the expenses, i.e. the Airline
could only deduct the repair expenses incrementally from its taxable
income over time.'" Thus, the Airline could not deduct the expenses
entirely from its taxable income during the year it incurred them. 137 As
discussed below, this resulted in the Airline suffering negative financial
effects and suggested that other airlines could succumb to a similar
fate.' 38
The FAA required the Airline to perform two types of inspections
on its aircraft engines: (1) a "hot section inspection" about every two
years and (2) a "major inspection" about every four years.'" A "hot
section inspection" included checking specific parts of the engine and
would cost between $25,000 and $80,000. 1 " On the other hand, a
"major inspection" involved a repeat of the "hot" inspection, but also
included a check on every component of the engine, as well as the
replacement of many of the component parts."' In performing the
inspection; the engine was normally taken off the wing and replaced
with an engine that had already been inspected. 142 With proper inspec-
tions and other maintenance, the Airline's engines could be expected
to last more than twenty-two years. 113 A "major inspection" for the Air-
line's A and B type aircraft would cost between $90,000 and $110,000,
while a major inspection performed on C and D types would cost
around $110,000.' 44
114 TAM 96-18-004 (Jan. 23, 1996).
135 See id.
136 See id.
137 See id. .
138 See id.; C,osis, supra note 8; Field, supra note 8 and accompanying text.





144 See TAM 96-18-009. A spokesperson for the Air Transport Association estimated recently
that airlines spend around $3 billion, or one third of their inspections and maintenance coals,
on "major inspections" each year. See Wald, supra note 1, at A5.
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The Service first reviewed the applicable law under sections 162
and 263 of the Code and cited Indopco for the policy objective. that
those sections were designed to achieve—namely, the proper matching
of expenses with the income they generate during a taxable period.'"
As part of this matching process, the Service stated, it is important to
consider the duration and extent of any benefits the taxpayer real-
izes.'" The Service emphasized the Indopco interpretations of the Code
which state that deductions are a matter of legislative grace and that
the taxpayer has the burden of showing the right to a claimed deduc-
tion."7 Before moving into the analysis of the Airline's case, the Service
also stated that distinctions between current expenditures and capital
investments required a careful examination of the facts.'"
The Service began its analysis by stating that the major inspection
costs materially increased the value of the Airline's engines under
section 263(a) (1) of the Code.'" The Service bolstered this statement
with several supporting factual findings.' 50 An engine with many new
or reconditioned parts, the Service found, is worth materially more
than an engine equipped with older or more worn components.m
Next, the Service looked to the FAA requirements to measure how
much the inspections resulted in increased value and prolonged life.'"
Accordingly, the Service reasoned that once an. is inspected, it
may once again be used for flights under the FAA requirements,
making the engine more valuable in that respect.'" The Service said
that, in effect, the inspections give each engine a new service life of
up to four years until the next inspection is required.'"
The Service then compared and contrasted the Airline's inspec-
tions to previous decisions. 155 First, the Service reasoned that the in-
spections were substantially similar to the costs considered in Rev. Rut
88-57 and that therefore the inspection costs should be capitalized.' 56
Then, the Service distinguished Plainfield Union from the inspections
145 See TAM 96-18-004. For a discussion of Indopco, see supra notes 51-69 and accompanying
text.
















 See TAM 96-18-004. For a discussion of Rev. Rut 88-57, see supra notes 103-19 and
accompanying text.
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performed in the TAM on several grounds.'" While the public utility
repaired the pipes in Plainfield Union because of a sudden change in
water source, the Airline inspected its engines to reverse the effects of
gradual wear and tear.' 58 Also, the Service stated that in Plainfield
Union, the pipe repairs did not increase the value, useful life or struc-
tural strength of the pipes; on the other hand, the same could not be
said for the inspections in the TAM.' 59
The TAM then compared the Airline's inspection costs to cases
where taxpayers had to capitalize the costs of replacing major compo-
nents on their capital assets. 16° For example, the Service found that
the Airline's expenditures were similar to those of LaSalle v. Commis-
sioner.' 6' In comparing LaSalle to, the Airline's costs, the Service an-
swered various arguments of the Airline.' 52 The Airline tried to distin-
guish LaSalle by looking to the ratio of the cost of repair to the cost of
a new piece of equipment.' 83 In LaSalle, the engine overhauls were half
the cost of a new truck. 16' On the other hand, the Airline asserted, the
engine repairs were only between 3% and 10% of the costs of a new
airplane.' 85 This argument did not persuade the Service; it pointed out
that taxpayers can be required to capitalize the costs of replacing
minor components of capital assets where replacing those components
results in prolonged life or increased value.' 85 After disposing of some
further issues, the Service found that the costs of the inspections
should be capitalized.'"
III, ANALYSIS
The time is right for a new standard to decide capitalization/de-
duction issues. 168 The current method, which relies primarily on am-
biguous case law and Code language, is unpredictable.' 59 TAM 96-18-
157 See TAM 96-18-004. For a discussion of Plainfield Union, see supra notes 75-79.
158 See TAM 96-18-004.
159 See id.
160 See id.
161 See id. For a discussion of LaSalle, see supra note 71.
162 See TAM 96-18-004.
163 See id.; see also supra note 106 and accompanying text.




168 LeBlanc, supra note 52 (commenting that taxpayers should have a bright line test to
ensure conservative, reasonable positions on tax returns); see Lee, supra note 51.
169 Some have suggested that prayer and fasting may be just as effective as any other method
for solving capitalization/deduction pi oblems, See Gunn, supra note 5, at 443.
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004 is further evidence of this unpredictability—the Service's reason-
ing therein is suspect and it was a clear departure from pertinent
precedents. 17° In addition, the IRS is clearly expanding the applicability
of section 263, and the TAM is recent evidence of this expansion. 17 ' A
more predictable standard would allow taxpayers to plan more effec-
tively for future tax liabilities and would reduce administrative burdens
on the Service and taxpayers alike. 172
Below, this Note takes issue with the Service's analysis in several
areas. 1 " Next, it offers some bright line tests for determining when
expenses should be capitalized as alternatives to the method used in
the TAM. 174 Finally, this Note suggests a conservative approach for
practitioners advising clients on capitalization/deduction issues. 175
The Service's future decisions can take a number of directions
and still be consistent with the current case law. 176 If the TAM is any
indication, the Service will further expand the application of section
263. 1 " In turn, this will result in greater revenues for the United States
Treasury Department.' 78 This increase in revenues was likely the incen-
tive for using questionable reasoning in the TAM to reach a finding of
capitalization.' 79
In the TAM, the Service misapplied the doctrine of rehabilitation
in several ways.' 8° The doctrine of rehabilitation is usually applied in
170 See infra notes 173-254 and accompanying text.
171
 See Costs, supra note 8, at 57.
In See infra notes 173-254 and accompanying text.
'77 See infra notes 173-254 and accompanying text. This Note assumes that the Service's
reasoning in the TAM expresses the reasoning of the Service in general. Therefore, references
to the reasoning as expressed in the TAM and the Service's reasoning arc treated as interchange-
able.
174 See infra notes 247-54 and accompanying text.
175
 See infra notes 255-56 and accompanying text.
176 Compare Plainfield Union v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 333, 338, 341 (1962) (allowing current
deduction of upgrade costs), with Rev. Rul. 88-57, 1988-2 C.B. 36, 37 (holding that refurbishment
of railroad cars was capital expenditure).
177 See TAM 96-18-004 (Jan. 23, 1996); Costs, supra note 8, at 57 (making point that TAM is
consistent with Service's expansion of 263).
170 This result is the reverse of the principle that a current deduction is worth more to a
taxpayer because of the time value of money. From the government's perspective, gaining more
tax revenues in the short term is worth more than having those revenues spread over future years.
See LeBlanc, supra note 52, at 465-66; see also Ingalls, supra note 6, at 1170 n.32 and accompa-
nying text.
179 See LeBlanc, supra note 52, at 465-66; see also Ingalls, supra note 6, at 1170 n.32 and
accompanying text.
1" See infra notes 181-96. It would not have been entirely novel for the Service to grant relief
from the tax consequences of the doctrine of rehabilitation for policy reasons. SeeJoint Committee
on Taxation Staff Description (JCX-37-96) of Selected Federal Tax Provisions that Impact Land Use,
Prepared for July 16 House Ways and Means Oversight Subcommittee Healing, Issued July 11, 1996
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cases where a single capital asset is improved pursuant to a plan.'" In
contrast, the Airline in the TAM was repairing many distinct capital
assets) 82 The Service attempted to overcome this distinction by relying
heavily on Rev. Rul. 88-57, but 88-57 is factually distinguishable from
the TAM on three counts) First, the railroad in 88-57 rehabilitated
its cars on a ten-year cycle.'" In contrast, the Airline conducts major
inspections using a cycle less than half as long as the railroad in
88-57.' 85 Second, the railroad cars were stripped to the frame and re-
built from the ground up for every major rehabilitation,' The air-
plane engines, on the other hand, only received replacement parts
where such parts were specifically needed according to FAA specifica-
tions.'" Third, when the railroad rehabilitated a car, it would then last
as long as a new car.'"When the Airline performed a major inspection,
the engine inspected could not necessarily be expected to last as long
as a newly-purchased engine.'"
Note the common aspect in each of these distinctions.'" In each
case, the benefits from the railroad's expenses lasted longer than the
benefits of the Airline's expenditures.'" When compared in this way,
and using the matching principle described above, the Airline's ex-
penses more closely resemble current expenses than those of the
railroad.'" The railroad was basically replacing its fleet of cars, while
the Airline was simply repairing its existing equipment)"
(corrected text), DAILY TAX REPORT, July 15, 1996, available in WESTLAW, BNA-TX database
(discussing tax credit for costs of rehabilitating historic structures). The Service does just this in
certain cases where historic landmarks are rehabilitated in order to foster more historic restora-
thm. See id. A similar argument has been made that the Service should treat inspection costs as
currently deductible to foster increased airline safety. See generally VVebwire•rcher Urges I.R.S. to
Reverse Stand on Airline Safety Inspections, 1996 WL I i125352, available in WESTLAW, COM.
database (quoting Congressman as saying TAM goes against safety concerns).
181 See Moss v. Commissioner, 831 F.2d 833, 839, 840-42 (9th Cir. 1987), Wolfsen Land C?
Cattle Co. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1, 18 (1979) (applying doctrine of rehabilitation to multiple
assets) and Rev. Rul. 88-57, 1988-2 C.B. 36, 37 (applying doctrine of rehabilitation to multiple
assets) arc exceptions.
182 See TAM 96-18-004.
1 g5 Compare generally TAM 96-18-009, with 88-57, 1988-2 C.B. 36. See Raby, supra note 38.
184
 See TAM 96-18-004; 88-57, 1988-2 C.B. at 36-37; see also Raby, supra note 38.
185 See TAM 96-18-004; 88-57, 1988-2 C.B. at 36-37; see also Raby, supra note 38.
I " See 88-57, 1988-2 C.B. at 36-37.
187 Compare TAM 96-18-004, with 88-57, 1988-2 C.B. at 36-37.
188 See 88-57, 1988-2 C.B. at 36-37; Raby, supra note 8.
189 See TAM 96-18-009; Raby, supra note 8.
188
 See supra notes 183-89 and accompanying text.
181 See supra notes 188-89 and accompanying text.
182 See supra notes 183-89 and accompanying text.
183 See supra notes 183-89 and accompanying text.
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Further, Plainfield Union and similar cases support the proposition
that because the inspections are only a minor part of the Airline's
business, they should not be considered a plan of rehabilitation.m
Other cases have employed a similar analysis, ruling that refurbishing
costs can be currently deducted, as long as they are a part of a tax-
payer's ongoing business.'" Thus, the Service's conclusion that a plan
of rehabilitation existed in the TAM was in error.'
The next two arguments against the TAM's reasoning highlight
the conflict between the original expectations and 88-57 analyses by
considering how the TAM measured how much major inspections
increase engine value and prolong engine life. 197 The TAM's test to
measure any increase in value resulting from the overhauls was im-
proper.'" Although the original expectations analysis of Plainfield Un-
ion should have been employed to measure the increase in value of
the airplane engines, the Service used the questionable method of
88-5Z' 99
The Airline examined in the TAM purchased the engines for a
price commensurate with the expectation that the engines would be
serviced regularly and kept within FAA specifications. 200
 Under the test
enunciated in Plainfield Union, inspecting the engines should not be
a capital expenditure. 20' Under the Plainfield Union test, the inspec-
tions do not increase the engines' value; those inspections simply allow
the engines to realize the value the airline expected them to have at
the time of purchase. 202 Therefore, because there was no increase in
value, the inspections should not be treated as capital expenditures."
Unfortunately for the Airline, the Service chose to use the method
of Rev. RuL 88-57 to measure increased value—perhaps because using
this method allows the Service to raise greater tax revenues. 404 As the
194 See Plainfield Union v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 333,339 (1962); see also TAM 96-18-004.
199 See Moss v. Commissioner, 831 F.2d 833,840-42 (9th Cir. 1987).
100 See supra notes 180-95 and accompanying text.
197
 See TAM 96-18-004; infra notes 198-218 and accompanying text.
I" See TAM 96-18-004; Lyke, supra note 52; see also Raby, supra note 38.
I" See Plainfield Union, 39 T.C. at 338; Reu Rul. 88-57, 1988-2 C.B. at 37; Lyke, supra note
52.
290
 See TAM 96-18-004; Field, supra note 7 (stating that the inspections just allow the engines
to live out their design lives).
201 See Plainfiekl Union, 39 T,C. at 338; see also Teitelbaum v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 541,
548 (7th Cir. 1961) (Major, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
292
 See Plainfield Union, 39 T.C. at 338; see also Teitelbaum, 294 F.2d at 548 (Major, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
210
 See Plainfield Union, 39 T.C. at 338; see also Teitelbaum, 294 F.2d at 548 (Major, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
294
 See TAM 96-18-004; 88-57,1988-2 C.B. at 37; see also supra note 178.
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Illinois Trust and Plainfield Union decisions point out, under the 88-57
test for increase in value, nearly all repairs can be considered capital
expenditures."' This is true because the . 88-57 test simply compares
the value of an asset immediately prior to the repair with the asset's
value immediately after the repair. 2p6 Thus, under this method, the
Service can deem almost any properly performed repair expense a
capital expenditure."7 As one commentator has pointed out, this
method for measuring value ignores clear language from the case law."
Thus, the taxpayer's dilemma is to guess which method the Service
will use in a given instance to measure increase in value. 240 Currently,
both the original expectations analysis and the valuation method of
88-57 are good law. 21° In addition, as mentioned above, these two
methods can lead to conflicting results; this makes capitalization/de-
duction decisions for taxpayers very difficult. 2 "
Consider the "hot inspections" the Airline performs as an example
of this anomalous situation. The FAA requires airlines to perform such
inspections, just as it requires major inspections. 212 But "hot inspec-
tions" occur about every two years, while major inspections occur about
every four years. 21 ' In addition, "hot inspections" do not include, as
major inspections do, examining all the major components of the
erigine. 2 " In short, "hot inspections" are much less comprehensive
than major inspections and occur twice as often as major inspections,
making "hot inspections" a much larger portion of current expendi-
tures under the matching principle. 215 Despite all this, under the 88-5 7
test, "hot inspections" could be classified as capital expenditures.216
This is true simply because any properly performed "hot inspection"
increases an engine's value over what it was before the inspection. 217
The original expectations analysis would avoid such a problematic
result and classify the "hot inspections" as current expenditures, be-
205 See Plainfield Union, 39 T.C. at 338; In re Illinois Merchants Trust Co., 4 B.A.T 103, 107
(1926).
702 See 88-57, 1988-2 C.B. at 37.
207 See TAM 96-18-004.
208
	 Lyke, supra note 52.
269 See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
210 See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
211 See supra note 46 and accompanying text.




216 See I.R.C. §§ 162, 263 (1994); 88-57, 1988-2 C.B. at 37; Costs, supra note 8, at 58.
217 See TAM 96-18-004; 88-57, 1988-2 C.B. at 37; Costs, supra note 8, at 58.
278	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 . [Vol. 39:253
cause under that analysis, the inspections do not increase the engines'
value. 2°'
Even if we leave aside the problematic conflict between the 88-57
and original expectations tests, that does not cure the flaws in the
Service's current method for deciding capitalization/deduction issues.
It is questionable to assert that an asset has an increased value solely
because it meets government regulations. 2 I 2 One commentator has
pointed out that congressional "wisdom" can be imperfect, so basing
an increase in value on compliance with regulations can lead to unfair
results.22° This is exactly what occurred in the TAM.221 Although the
Service did give figures on how much major inspections normally cost,
it never gave a dollar figure on how much a typical major inspection
increases the value of an engine. 222 Also, instead of calculating in-
creased value based on the value of any replacement components, the
Service mainly attributed increased value to complying with govern-
ment regulations.2" In other words, the Service emphasized complying
with government regulations as the real value of major inspections, but
it only mentions overhauling the engine by replacing components as
an increase in value. 224
In addition, in a move that clearly takes the capitalization/deduc-
tion doctrine in a new direction, the Service also used government
regulations in the TAM as the measure of how much major inspections
prolong engine life.225 The Service found that major inspections had
to occur under FAA regulations about every four years.'" So, after
a finished inspection, the inspected engine is good for about four years
from the FAA's perspective."' On the other hand, note that with
proper periodic inspections, an engine will usually last around twenty-
two years. 228 This means that when an airline purchases an engine, the
price is commensurate with the twenty-two year expected life span for
215 See Plainfield Union, 39 T.C. at 338.
219 See Teitelbaum v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 541, 548 (7th Cir. 1961) (Major, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part); Lee A. Sheppard, News Analysis: Is the IRS Abusing Indopco?,
NEWS STORIES, Sept. 1, 1992, available in WESTLAW, 92 TNT 178-10 (questioning such reasoning
in context of asbestos removal).
220 See Sheppard, supra note 219 (commenting that bringing asset in line with regulations
does not necessarily lead to increased value).
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the engine. 229 Putting this in terms of the original expectations analysis,
the Airline's original expectations upon purchasing the engines was to
keep them flying for around twenty-two years by regularly inspecting
or repairing them."° Indeed, the proper focus should be on whether
the inspections are compensating for anything more than normal wear
and tear, as it would be under the original expectations analysis. 231 Of
course, under this analysis, the inspections compensate for only nor-
mal engine use.'" Thus the inspections do not really prolong the life
of the engines.'"
With this in mind, the Service's finding that each major inspection
increases an engine's life by another four years is clearly erroneous." 4
A major inspection simply allows an engine to live out its normally
expected operational life.'" What led to the TAM's anomalous result?
By using novel reasoning to bolster its arguments, the Service is taking
repairs cases in the capitalization/deduction area in a new direction.'"
In effect, the Service is using compliance with government regulations
to say that the operational life of an asset is increased."' When govern-
ment regulations force a taxpayer to perform a certain task regarding
an asset, however, that task may not increase the useful life of the asset
involved independent of the government regulation.'" Asbestos re-
moval is a good example of this; removing asbestos pursuant to gov-
ernment regulations does not necessarily increase the useful life of the
asset involved.'" The major inspections at issue in the TAM are similar
to asbestos removal in that the inspections do not increase the useful
life of the engines involved.'" Therefore, it is erroneous for the Service
223 See TAM 96-18-004; see also Field, supra note 7.
25° See TAM 96-18-004; see also Field, supra note 7.
231 See Raby, supra note 38.
252 See id.
253 See id.
234 See Field, supra note 7.
235 See id.
2" Compare. Cerda v. United States, No. 82 C 3852, 1984 WL 2803, at *4-5 (N.D. III. Apr. 30,
1984) (mentioning only meeting Chicago's building code as creating increase in value), and
Hotel Sulgrave, Inc. v. Commissioner, 21 T.C. 619, 620-21 (1954) (mentioning only meeting
regulations as creating increase in value), with TAM 96-18-004 (mentioning meeting regulations
as something which increases life).
2-37 See TAM 96-18-004.
2." Of course, an asset that can be used under government regulations has a longer useful
life than one which cannot, but this conclusion makes for circular logic in this context. For
criticism of similar circularity, sec Plainfield Union a Commissioner, 39 T.C. 333, 388 (1962) and
In re Illinois Merchants Trust, 4 E.T.A. 103, 107 (1926).
233 See Tech. Adv. Mein. 92-40-004 (June 29, 1992).
249 See TAM 96-18-004; Raby, supra note 38.
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to conclude that each major inspection gives an engine four more years
of operational life. 241
In addition to using this novel reasoning, the Service also failed
to address a major technical consideration in the TAM. The Service
nearly ignored the issue of whether allowing the Airline to deduct
major inspection costs currently would distort its calculation of its
taxable income. 212 It is true that the Airline was gaining future benefits
from the inspections, so presumably, under the matching principles of
Code sections 162 and 263, the expenses should have been capital-
ized. 243 There is a strong argument, however, that currently deducting
the expenditures would not distort income. 244 As long as the Airline
inspects twenty-five percent of its fleet every year, currently deducting
the inspection costs would not distort the Airline's income over time. 245
With this, one can reasonably assert that allowing the Airline to cur-
rently deduct the inspection costs would be congruent with the policies
behind Code sections 162 and 263. 246
In light of the arguments above, and given the ambiguity of cur-
rent precedents, now is the time for a more predictable, logically sound
method for determining when an expense should be capitalized and
when it can be currently deducted. 247 For taxpayers like the Airline in
the TAM, the classification of recurring expenses has significant finan-
cial consequences. 248 Yet, under the current statutory language and
241
 See TAM 96-18-004; Raby, supra note 38. The Code supports this assertion. Under the
applicable class life system, the engines have a life of twelve years. See Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-
12(c1) (3) (ii) (1997). With this in mind, for the Service to say that the engines have four year
operational lives based on government regulations goes against the Internal Revenue Code itself.
See
242 The TAM never discussed this argument directly. See generally TAM 96-18-004. It is true,
though, that the policy rationales behind Code sections 162 and 263 are to properly match
income with the expenses paid to generate that income. See Inddpco, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503
U.S. 79, 84 (1992); TAM 96-18-004.
242 See TAM 96-18-004.
244 See Lee, supra note 51; Lee, supra note 2.
242 See Lee, supra note 51; Lee, supra note 2.
246 See Lee, supra note 51; Lee, supra note 2; see also I.R.C. §§ 162, 263; TAM 96-18-004.
247 See LeBlanc, supra note 52 (commenting on capitalization/deduction area in cases not
dealing with repairs); Lee, supra note 51 (suggesting alternative of treating any cost that exceeds
certain percentage of asset's depreciation allowance as capital expenditure); Lee, supra note 2
(stating alternative of treating any cost which exceeds certain percentage of asset's resale value
as a capital expenditure). The Service implicitly rejected such an approach when it said that even
a minor replacement could trigger capital gains treatment where the repair resulted in an
increase in value. See TAM 96-18-004. Of course, this brings the discussion back to the argument
over the proper measure of increase in value. See Gunn, supra note 3 (stating that the only
meaningful difference between currently deductible expenses and capital expenditures are
amount of money spent and frequency of occurrence).
242 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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case law for classifying repair expenditures, it is difficult for a taxpayer
to plan for future tax liabilities. 242 This is true because, as pointed out
above, tests used to measure increase in value and prolonged life
clearly give conflicting results. 25° This leaves taxpayers guessing as to
when the Service will choose to deem a given repair expense a capital
expenditure. 2" There have been several proposals for more predictable
tests. The Service and Congress should study these proposals to see if
they are viable. 252 One alternative suggests that any expense over a
certain percentage of an asset's depreciation value should be a capital
expenditure.252 A second alternative suggests treating any expense over
a certain percentage of the asset's resale value as a capital expendi-
ture. 2"
Until a change occurs, practitioners should keep in mind that
under the current standard, almost any repair expense that creates
benefits lasting beyond the current year can be considered a capital
expenditure. 255 This creates a tough situation for tax practitioners ad-
vising clients who are incurring repair expenses that generate benefits
into future years.256 Certainly, the most conservative advice would be
to capitalize any repair expense that generates benefits into future
years. Beyond this, it is tough to make a definitive judgment about how
repair expenses should be treated.
CONCLUSION
A clearer standard for distinguishing repairs and capital costs is
sorely needed. As TAM 96-18--D04 illustrates, along with the cases cited
above, the present state of the doctrine can leave taxpayers guessing
as to the proper treatment for business expenditures. A more predict-
able system would save taxpayers and practitioners alike time and
energy without significantly compromising policy considerations. Con-
gress and the Service should address this issue with all deliberate
speed.
BYRON PAVANO
249 See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
250 See supra note 197 and accompanying text,
251 See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
252 See supra notes 253-54 and accompanying text.
255 See Lee, supra note 51.
254 See Lee, supra note 2.
255 See supra note 205.
250 See supra note 205.
